Domestic politics - democratic regression?

David Madden

On 4 March, the SEESOX seminar series  “Revisiting Convergence” looked at Democratic Regression: mainly in South East Europe (SEE), but also straying into Southern and Central Europe. The speakers were Iveta Radicova, Othon Anastasakis and Kerem Oktem; and Jonathan Scheele was an active chair. This brief post cannot do justice to the richness and texture of the presentations and subsequent discussion, but picks out some themes.

   The EU perspective is not as credible now as previously, and the accession process has tended to stagnate. Traditionally “Brussels” was seen as “better” than national institutions, though this is less the case now. Nevertheless there is no better model for political and economic reform in SEE than the EU.

   Divisions in Europe are North/South, East/West, large countries/small countries. Also old democracies/new democracies. In the former there is little evidence of long term decline of trust in government, and relative satisfaction with the performance of democracy over time. By contrast, the 1989 revolutions were a positive event, but it is not possible to say that the majority has enthusiastically embraced the new way of life and the accompanying social and economic transformation.

   In many SEE countries there is political instability and symptoms of a crisis of democratic representation. The democratic deficit, which could be broadly defined as the gap between expectation and satisfaction, can lead to apathy (including aggressive apathy) or protest (often violent).Youth unemployment tends to produce an underclass. Situations are made worse by endemic corruption.

   There are some positives, compared for example with the 1930s. Democratic procedures provide the only way forward, politicians are under scrutiny, the social media broaden communication. The extreme right is on the increase only in Greece.

   Turkey is different: steady economic growth, a rising power, the 16^th largest economy in the world (with plans to be the 10^th). There are more negative signs: exports mainly to low-tech markets, rising labour costs, difficulties arising from the Arab Spring etc. The EU has misplayed accession, with the risk that Turkey might slip its EU “anchor”. Yet the EU is still Turkey’s main trading partner, and Turkey remains firmly in the Euro-Atlantic world.

   There is something of a crisis of confidence and imagination in SEE, and in the EU. But in SEE there are no national solutions to international problems. They (and we) are all in this together.